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Going to Pot 
by Carl E. Schneider 
I n several earlier columns, I suggested that judges are usually poorly placed 
to make good biomedical policy, not 
least because the law so rarely offers 
them direct and cogent guidance. Re-
cently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit proffered a new example 
of this old problem. 
In 1996, California's voters approved 
Proposition 215. Its "Compassionate 
Use Act of 1996" provided -that a pa-
tient "who possesses or cultivates mari-
juana for the personal medical purposes 
of the patient upon the written or oral 
recommendation or approval of a physi-
cian" committed no crime. 
California's demarche leaves intact 
federal drug regulation. The Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) 1 states: "Except as 
authorized by this subchapter, it shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally . . . to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense, or possess with in-
tent to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, a controlled substance." And it is 
"unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally to possess a controlled sub-
stance unless such substance was ob-
tained directly, or pursuant to a valid 
prescription or order, from a practition-
" er. 
The CSA divides controlled sub-
stances into five schedules. Schedule I is 
the most restrictive. Drugs in it have "a 
high potential for abuse," "no currently 
accepted medical use in treatment," and 
no safe use. Schedule I drugs may be 
used only for federally approved re-
search. By Congressional direction, 
marijuana is a Schedule I drug. Drugs 
on Schedules II-V, however, may be pre-
scribed by doctors registered by the 
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Drug Enforcement Agency. Registration 
may be revoked if"registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest." 
Both the Clinton and Bush adminis-
trations have insisted that California's le-
galization of marijuana for medical uses 
does not alter federal drug laws. In 
1998, for example, the United States 
sued to enjoin an organization distribut-
ing marijuana under the aegis of Propo-
sition 215. The organization argued that 
distribution was medically necessary 
and that the CSA implicitly authorized 
such a defense. A panel of Ninth Circuit 
judges thought this a "legally cognizable 
defense" that the district court should 
consider. 2 But in United States v. Oak-
land Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,3 the 
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously dis-
agreed. A necessity defense "traditionally 
covered the situation where physical 
forces beyond the actor's control ren-
dered illegal conduct the lesser of two 
evils," but that was not the Coopera-
tive's situation. And while the Coopera-
tive alleged that marijuana was medical-
ly necessary, the CSA itself"reflects a de-
termination that marijuana has no med-
ical benefits worthy of an exception." 
In 1997, the government defended 
the CSA by reiterating its authority to 
1) prosecute any physician who pre-
scribes or recommends marijuana 
to patients; 2) prosecute any patient 
who uses prescribed marijuana; 3) 
revoke the DEA registration num-
bers of any physician who pre-
scribes or recommends marijuana 
to patients; 4) exclude any physi-
cian who prescribes or recommends 
marijuana to patients from the 
Medicaid and Medicare programs; 
and 5) enforce all federal sanctions 
against physicians and patients.4 
A group of California patients and 
physicians then sued to enjoin, inter 
alia, Janet Reno and Donna Shalala 
from implementing this policy. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated 
their first amendment rights. The dis-
trict court eventually enjoined the gov-
ernment from "(i) revoking any physi-
cian class member's DEA registration 
merely because the doctor makes a rec-
ommendation for the use of medical 
marijuana based on a sincere medical 
judgment and (ii) from initiating any 
investigation solely on that ground." On 
29 October 2002, in Conant v. Walters, a 
Ninth Circuit panel ratified the injunc-
tion because the government's policy 
struck "at core First Amendment inter-
ests of doctors and patients. An integral 
component of the practice of medicine 
is the communication between a doctor 
and a patient."5 
By the time the Ninth Circuit decid-
ed Conant, a district court in the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit had decided a 
similar case-Pearson v. McCaffrey. 6 
That court saw no first amendment 
problem because the government's poli-
cy left doctors and patients free to dis-
cuss marijuana's medical qualities until 
the cows came home: 
It is clear that, short of a prescrip-
tion or recommendation for mari-
juana, the federal government will 
not get involved in communication 
between doctors, patients, and re-
searchers regarding the potential 
medical benefits of marijuana use. 7 
The Ninth Circuit is not bound by 
the D.C. Circuit's decisions, nor is a 
U.S. Court of Appeals bound by prece-
dents of U.S. District Courts (which are 
trial courts). However, Conant's treat-
ment of Pearson is baffling. Conant says 
Pearson withheld an injunction "because 
the plaintiffs in that case did not factual-
ly support their claim that the policy 
chilled their speech." But Pearson says 
nothing about chills. Rather, it distin-
guishes "discussion" from "the recom-
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mendation and prescription of the 
drug." 
Half a century ago, the Supreme 
Court flatly denied that the first amend-
ment "extends its immunity to speech or 
writing used as an integral part of con-
duct in violation of a valid criminal 
stature. "8 As Pearson notes, many crimes 
are '"committed purely by word of 
mouth, such as obtaining money by 
false pretenses, extortion, broadcasting 
treasonable utterances, and many oth-
ers."'9 Conant does not say the CSA is 
invalid. Conant concedes that a prescrip-
tion for marijuana violates the act. In-
deed, it is a crime.10 In California, a "rec-
ommendation" for marijuana is effec-
tively a prescription. Presumably, there-
fore, it too affronts the CSA. This is just 
what Pearson says: "In these situations, a 
recommendation is analogous to a pre-
scription, therefore, the federal govern-
ment will treat it as such." 11 
I wish I could confidently describe 
Conant's response to this argument. In 
apparent retort, Conant says that, if the 
physician intended for the patient to use 
the recommendation to obtain marijua-
na, "then a physician would be guilty of 
aiding and abetting the violation of fed-
eral law." And Conant says that the in-
junction does not prevent the govern-
ment from prosecuting physicians for 
that aiding and abetting. True enough. 
But so what? If a "recommendation" is a 
prescription, if it gives patients access to 
marijuana, then making a recommenda-
tion itself contravenes the CSA and 
therefore is not protected by the first 
amendment. 
Furthermore, the injunction does not 
bar criminal prosecutions; it bars revok-
ing DEA registrations. The CSA re-
quires revocation where "the public in-
terest" requires it. Congress adopted that 
broad formula precisely to allow the 
government to respond not just to 
physicians' crimes, but also to their fail-
ures to obey meticulously the elaborate 
rules governing drug use and to exercise 
their authority over drugs responsibly. 
The government is thus presumably en-
titled and obliged to consider a physi-
cian's advice and acts concerning a drug 
that Congress declared has no legitimate 
medical purpose, a declaration the 
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Supreme Court left unmolested in Oak-
land Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative. 
More broadly, while doctors and pa-
tients have first amendment interests, 
those interests are not necessarily con-
gruent. The patient's interest is primari-
ly in receiving useful and reliable infor-
mation, not whatever information a 
physician may proffer. This is why Judge 
Reinhardt could write in the assisted-
suicide case that, "since doctors are high-
ly-regulated professionals, it should not 
be difficult for the state or the profession 
itself to establish rules and procedures 
that will ensure that the occasional neg-
ligent or careless recommendation by a 
licensed physician will not result in an 
uninformed or erroneous decision by 
the patient or his family." 12 And this is 
why the Supreme Court could say in a 
pivotal abortion case: "To be sure, the 
physician's First Amendment rights not 
to speak are implicated, bur only as part 
of the practice of medicine, subject to 
reasonable licensing and regulation by 
the State. We see no constitutional infir-
mity in the requirement that the physi-
cian provide the information mandated 
by the State here."l3 
Dubious as Conant's prohibition on 
revoking doctors' DEA registration is, its 
prohibition on initiating investigations 
because a doctor has "recommended" 
marijuana is more so. Conant acknowl-
edges that such recommendations may 
violate the CSA. When the government 
discovers behavior that may be illegal, 
surely it may and perhaps must investi-
gate that behavior. What is more, there 
are separation-of-powers reasons to 
question a court's authority to prevent 
the executive branch from initiating in-
vestigations, and Conant cites no prece-
dent for such an order. 
Nor would a contrary result in Co-
nant leave California's doctors as flies to 
the government's wanton boys. Conant 
proffers no evidence that the defendants 
had abused their authority. Further-
more, they are constrained by battalions 
of constitutional, statutory, and admin-
istrative regulations, and their decisions 
are subject to judicial review. 
I have done my best to summarize 
Conant accurately, but it is so Delphic-
dare I say incoherent?-that I may have 
misrepresented it. And the reader may 
have found my analysis unsatisfying. In 
a way, I do mysel£ Why? Largely be-
cause what motivated the government's 
policy and the plaintiff's suit had noth-
ing to do with the first amendment. 
First amendment jurisprudence speaks 
to the issues in the case lamely at best. 
The real dispute is about the wisdom of 
the state and federal marijuana policies. 
But courts lack the authority, informa-
tion, and expertise to resolve that chal-
lenging and controversial issue. Judges 
who succumb to the temptation to do so 
through the first amendment are using a 
butter knife to carve marble-they must 
bungle the job and mangle the tool. 
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